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The Definition of "Serious Health Condition"
Under the Family Medical Leave Act
JESSICA BECKETr-MCWALTER*
INTRODUCTION
Congress intended the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 (the "Act"
or "FMLA") to provide "a sensible response to the growing conflict be-
tween work and family by establishing a right to unpaid family and medi-
cal leave for all workers covered [by] the act."' The FMLA allows an
eligible employee to take up to a total of twelve work weeks of leave dur-
ing a twelve-month period because of the employee's serious health con-
dition or in order to care for a child, spouse, or parent with a serious
health condition Legislative history indicates that Congress intended for
the definition of "serious health condition" to be broad, but did not in-
tend for it to cover short-term illnesses covered by other sick leave poli-
cies.3 Congress also wanted to protect employers from unforeseen costs
associated with unexpected employee absences and employee abuse of
leave provisions.4 The Department of Labor's final regulations, promul-
gated to carry out the Act, contain an objective test to determine
whether an illness constitutes a "serious health condition. '
Congress gave the Department of Labor the task of prescribing
regulations to carry out the FMLA.6 The Act and these regulations, how-
ever, have proven difficult for courts, employers, and employees to in-
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2004; B.A., Brown Uni-
versity, 1998. I would like to thank Professor Reuel Schiller for his guidance and support and helpful
comments on drafts of this Note. I would also like to thank Claire Hamady for her insightful com-
ments and edits to earlier drafts of this paper.
i. S. REP. No. 103-3, at 4 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,6.
2. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2000).
3. S. REP. No. 103-3, at 28, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 30.
4. Id. at 25, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 27.
5. 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a) (2003).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 2654 (2000).
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terpret and apply.7 The final regulations contain an objective "bright-
line" test to determine whether an illness constitutes a "serious health
condition."8 Case law reveals that this bright-line test is simultaneously
over-inclusive and under-inclusive. An alternative to the Department of
Labor's bright-line test is a subjective "balancing test" which would in-
corporate the factors found in the Department of Labor's test as well as
two other factors that address Congress's concern that employees may
abuse the Act's leave provisions. These two factors are (i) evidence of
prior unexplained absences and (2) whether the employer received no-
tice as required by the statute. A balancing test would lead the courts to
look at the entire context of an employee's need for medical treatment
and leave, which will result in more equitable and accurate determina-
tions.
This Note argues that, contrary to the Department of Labor's desire
to establish an objective test that would allow courts to reach accurate
and predictable decisions, judicial outcomes under the Department of
Labor's test are neither accurate nor predictable. Parts I and II consider
the statute's language and Congress's intent in enacting the Act. Part III
describes the Department of Labor's regulations. Part IV considers how
the regulations apply to leave "in order to care for" family members with
"serious health conditions." Part V examines how the Supreme Court
has interpreted the Department of Labor's definition of "serious health
condition" as a bright-line test. Finally, Part VI argues that the Depart-
ment of Labor should replace its bright-line test.
I. THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE
In the forty years preceding the passage of the FMLA, "the United
States experienced a dramatic revolution in the composition of the work-
force," which had "a profound effect on the lives of working men and
women."9 As of January 27, 1993, ninety-six percent of fathers and sixty-
five percent of American mothers worked outside the home.' ° The Sen-
ate found that families were struggling to perform an essential function
of caring for themselves and their family members who required psycho-
logical or physical medical treatment." The goal of the FMLA was to
provide basic leave for employees in a cost-effective manner for employ-
12
ers.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a) (2003).
9. S. REP. No. 103-3, at 6, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 8.
io. Id. at 5-6, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7-8.
ii. Id. at 7, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 9.
12. Id. at 4, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6.
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The FLMA states:
An eligible employee shall be entitled to a total of 12 workweeks of
leave during any i 2-month period for one or more of the following:
A. Because of the birth of a son or daughter of the employee and
in order to care for such son or daughter.
B. Because of the placement of a son or daughter with the em-
ployee for adoption or foster care.
C. In order to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent,
of the employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a
serious health condition.
D. Because of a serious health condition that makes the em-
ployee unable to perform the functions of the position of such
employee."
The statute defines "serious health condition" as "an illness, injury, im-
pairment, or physical or mental condition that involves: (A) inpatient
care in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical facility; or (B) continu-
ing treatment by a health care provider." 4 The Act also requires the em-
ployee to give notice of intended leave:
The employee.., shall provide the employer with not less than 30
days' notice, before the date the leave is to begin, of the employee's in-
tention to take leave.., except that if the date of the treatment re-
quires leave to begin in less than 30 days, the employee shall provide
notice as is practicable.'"
The Senate Report states that an employee must provide the em-
ployer with at least thirty days' notice of the need for leave when that
need is foreseeable. 6 This thirty days' notice requirement does not apply
in cases of medical emergency or other unforeseen events.'7 An employer
may additionally require an employee to support his request for leave
with a certification of the condition issued by the health care provider.'
8
A sufficient certification includes the date the condition began, the likely
duration of the condition, and appropriate medical facts regarding the
condition. 9 This certification is intended as "a check against employee
abuse of leave.""0 Both of these provisions were intended to reduce the
13. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2000).
14. Id. § 2611(11).
15. Id. § 2612(e)(2)(B).
i6. S. REP. No. 103-3, at 25 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 27.
17. Id.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 2613(a).
i9. Id. § 2613 (b).
20. S. REP. No. 103-3, at 25-26
,
reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 27-28.
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cost to employers by allowing them to anticipate a shortage in workforce
and to control potential employee abuse of the leave provisions.'
II. THE SENATE'S DEFINITION OF "SERIOUS HEALTH CONDITION"
The major sticking point in enforcing the Act has been determining
whether an employee has a "serious health condition" affording him the
Act's protection. The Senate Report explains that Congress intended the
definition of "serious health condition" to be broad and
cover various types of physical and mental conditions.. . [that] affect
an employee's health to the extent that he or she must be absent from
work on a recurring basis or for more than a few days for treatment or
recovery.... With respect to a child, spouse or parent, the term "seri-
ous health condition" [was] intended to cover conditions or illnesses
that affect the health of the child, spouse or parent such that he or she
is similarly unable to participate in school or in his or her regular daily
activities."
The Senate Report states that the FMLA was not intended to cover
"short-term conditions for which treatment and recovery are very brief,"
because the Senate assumed that such conditions would fall within even
the most modest sick leave policies.23 Minor illnesses that last only a few
days and surgical procedures that do not involve hospitalization and re-
quire only a brief recovery period were therefore not intended to be "se-
rious health conditions" under the FMLA.'
The Senate Report provides a non-exhaustive list of serious health
conditions that includes heart attacks, most cancers, back conditions re-
quiring extensive therapy or surgical procedures, strokes, and spinal inju-
ries. 5 The list also includes "severe nervous disorders" and "ongoing
pregnancy, miscarriages, complications or illnesses relating to pregnancy,
severe morning sickness, the need for prenatal care, childbirth, and re-
covery from childbirth. ' '26 All of these conditions require absence from
work for either the condition itself or continual medical treatment or su-
pervision. 7
21. Id.
22. S. REP. No. 103-3, at 28, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 30.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 29, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 31.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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III. THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR'S REGULATIONS
Congress directed the Department of Labor to prescribe regulations
as necessary to carry out the FMLA . On March io, 1993, the Depart-
ment of Labor published a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal
Register and received a total of 393 comments before issuing the interim
rules." In addition, the Department met with congressional staff and out-
side parties to provide background information and raise questions to be
considered in preparation of the notice of proposed rulemaking.0 The
Department also worked with the U.S. Office of Personnel Management
(OPM) to coordinate their respective rulemaking efforts under the Act.3 1
The Department received over 900 comments before issuing the fi-
nal rules.3' The Department of Labor received eighty-eight comments on
the definition of serious health condition alone.33 On January 6, 1995, the
Department issued the final regulations to accompany the FMLA 
4
The final rules define "serious health condition" as an "illness, in-
jury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves inpatient
care or continuing treatment. '35 "Inpatient care" is defined as an "over-
night stay, including any period of incapacity or any subsequent treat-
ment connected to such inpatient care. '36 "Incapacity" is defined as the
"inability to work, attend school or perform other regular daily activities
due to a serious heath condition."37
In defining "continuing treatment," the Department borrowed from
the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, "Continuing treat-
ment" by a health care provider includes one of five things. First, con-
tinuing treatment includes a period of incapacity of more than three
consecutive calendar days, and any subsequent treatment or period of in-
capacity relating to the same condition that involves either two visits to
health care provider, or one visit with a followed regimen of continual
treatment.39 "Continual treatment" includes prescription drugs and/or
therapy, and continued supervision. 4° Some commentators were con-
28. See 29 U.S.C. § 2654 (2000).
29. FMLA, 60 Fed. Reg. 218o (Jan. 6, 1995) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.114).
30. See id.
31. Id. OPM administers the FMLA provisions that apply to Federal civil service employees.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 2192.
34- Id.
35. 29 C.F.R. § 825.3I4 (2003).
36. Id.
37. Id. § 825.1 14(a)(2)(i).
38. FMLA, 60 Fed. Reg. 825,2180, 2192 (Jan. 6, 995) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.14).
39. 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)(i)(A)-(B).
40. Id. § 825 .114 (b).
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cerned that the "more than three days" requirement encouraged em-
ployees to stay home longer than needed.4' Others were concerned that
the three-day requirement was contrary to the statute and argued that
seriousness and duration do not necessarily correlate.42 Still others
thought that the number of days should be extended.'3 The final rules,
however, require a period of incapacity of more than three consecutive
calendar days.'
The second form of continuing treatment is any period of incapacity
due to pregnancy or prenatal care.45 The Department stated that it was
clear from the Act's legislative history that pregnancy was intended to be
treated as a serious health condition. 6 It explained that "pregnancy was
similar to a chronic condition in that the patient is periodically visiting a
health care provider for prenatal care, but may be subject to episodes of
severe morning sickness.., which may not require an absence from work
of more than three days.
47
The third form of continuing treatment is any period of incapacity
due to a chronic serious health condition. "Chronic serious health condi-
tion" is defined as one which:
A. Requires periodic visits for treatment by a health care pro-
vider, or by a nurse or physician's assistant under direct su-
pervision of a health care provider;
B. Continues over an extended period of time (including recur-
ring episodes of a single underlying condition; and
C. May cause episodic rather than a continuing period of inca-
pacity (e.g., asthma, diabetes, epilepsy, etc.).
The fourth form of continuing treatment is a period of incapacity
that is permanent or long-term due to a condition for which treatment
may not be effective. 9 The Department's final rules eliminated "incur-
able" as a requisite quality of a chronic or long-term health condition.
The rules require instead that the condition involve a period of incapac-
ity that is permanent or long-term and for which treatment may not be
effective. The Department agreed with comments that argued that
chronic illnesses should be covered by the Act even if incapacity did not
41. FMLA, 6o Fed Reg. at 2192.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. Id. at 2 T95.
45. 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)(ii).
46. FMLA, 6o Fed. Reg. at 2195.
47. Id.
48. 29 C.F.R. § 825.1 4(a)(2)(iii).
49. Id. § 825.1i4(a)(2)(iv).
50. FMLA, 60 Fed. Reg. at 2195.
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last for three consecutive days, as long as the individual was under the
supervision of a health care provider."
The fifth form of serious health condition involving continuing treat-
ment is:
Any period of absence to receive multiple treatments, (including any
period of recovery therefrom), by a health care provider or by a pro-
vider of health care services under orders of, or on referral by, a health
care provider, either for restorative surgery after an accident or other
injury, or for a condition that would likely result in a period of incapac-
ity of more than three consecutive calendar days in the absence of
medical intervention or treatment, such as cancer (chemotherapy, ra-
diation, etc.), severe arthritis (physical therapy), kidney disease (dialy-
sis). "
Although the final rules recognize chronic serious health conditions
they do not require that the condition be chronic or long-term to qualify
as a serious health condition because some conditions like cancer might
not meet the test if immediate intervention occurs. 3
Many comments recommended including a list of illnesses as found
in the legislative history.' The Department declined to include such a list
because its inclusion might lead employers to recognize only conditions
on the list or to second-guess whether a condition is equally serious
rather than apply the regulatory standard.5 The Department explained,
however, that the common cold, flu, minor ulcer, headaches, upset stom-
ach, routine dental or orthodontia problems, and periodontal diseases
are not ordinarily serious health conditions."
In response to confusion in the courts regarding the applicability of
the Act to minor illnesses, the Department of Labor issued two opinion
letters. The first opinion letter, issued on April 7, 1995, stated that the
flu, absent complications, did not meet the definition of serious health
condition simply because an employee met the regulation's bright-line
test of three days of incapacity and treatment."' On December 12, 1996,
the Department of Labor issued an opinion letter retracting the April 7,
1995 opinion. This opinion letter clarified that minor conditions are not
ordinarily serious medical conditions under the FMLA because they do
51. Id.
52. 29 C.F.R. § 825.I 14(a)(2)(v).
53. See FMLA, 60 Fed. Reg. at 2195.
54- Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Paula J. Dehan, Has the FMLA Been Stretched Beyond Its Intended Scope?, 29 N. Ky. L. Rev.
629,632 (2002).
58. Id.
59. Id.
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not meet the regulatory definition of a serious health condition as out-
lined in 29 C.F.R. § 825.1 14(c). 6 The letter states, however, that although
minor illnesses would not usually meet the regulatory requirements,
complications were not required in order for a minor illness to meet the
requirements.' The letter explains that the condition in question would
be a serious health condition if it caused the employee to be incapaci-
tated for three consecutive days and required a regimen of continuing
treatment by a health care provider.2
A. SUMMARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR'S RULES FOR DETERMINING
WHETHER AN EMPLOYEE HAS A "SERIOUS HEALTH CONDITION"
According to the Department of Labor's regulations, a "serious
health condition" is an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental
condition that involves:
i. Inpatient Care (i.e., an overnight stay) including any period
of incapacity or any subsequent treatment therefore, or any
subsequent treatment in connection with such inpatient
care; or
2. Continuous Treatment by a health care provider, which in-
cludes any one or more of the following:
a. Period of incapacity that involves either
i. Treatment of two or more times by health
care provider, or
ii. Treatment on at least one occasion which
results in a regimen of continuing treatment
under the supervision of a health care pro-
vider.
b. A period of incapacity due to either
i. Pregnancy; or
ii. Prenatal care.
c. Any period of incapacity or treatment for such inca-
pacity due to a chronic serious health condition
which:
i. Requires periodic visits for treatment by a
health care provider, and
6o. Wage and Hour Div., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Opinion Letter FMLA-86 (Dec. 12, 1996), avail-
able at I996 WL 1044783.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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ii. Continues over an extended period of time,
and
iii. May cause episodic rather than a continuing
period of incapacity (e.g. asthma, diabetes,
epilepsy, etc.)
d. A period of incapacity, which is permanent or long-
term due to a condition for which treatment may not
be effective.
e. Any period of absence to receive multiple treat-
ments by a health care provider either for
i. Restorative surgery after an accident or in-
jury; or
ii. A condition that would likely result in a pe-
riod of incapacity of more than three
consecutive calendar days in the absence of
medical intervention or treatment, such as
cancer (chemotherapy, radiation, etc.), se-
vere arthritis (physical therapy), or kidney
disease (dialysis). 63
IV. THE COURTS' INTERPRETATION OF "SERIOUS HEALTH CONDITION"
Although the Department of Labor's test appears to allow flexibil-
ity, the test has proven difficult for employers and courts to implement.
Defining "serious health condition" is difficult because the Department
of Labor's test, implemented by the federal courts, has not yielded con-
sistent or predictable results. Rather, the case law indicates that the cur-
rent definition of "serious health condition" is simultaneously under-
inclusive and over-inclusive. The only way an employee can take a leave
of absence from his job, attend to his or a family member's medical con-
dition, and be secure that his job will be waiting when he returns is if the
condition meets the definition of a "serious health condition." One em-
ployment attorney stated: "I sometimes tell clients that Department of
Labor regulations on the FMLA have two booby traps a page. If you sat
down to write something that would frustrate employers and make their
lives difficult and absorb administrative attention of human resources
people, you could not come up with anything that would do that much
more than what we have."6' Many employers have problems "maneuver-
63. 29 C.F.R. § 825.I14(a) (2003).
64. Judy Greenwald, Employers Blast FMLA Expansion, 4 th Circuit Rules Flu Cases Eligible for
Leave, Bus. INS., May 14, 2OO, available at 2001 WL 5101439.
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ing through the gray areas of defining which serious medical conditions
and child care are covered under FMLA." 65
A. CHEVRON DEFERENCE
In Chevron v. National Resources Defense Council, the Supreme
Court held that, when determining whether or not to defer to a Federal
agency's interpretation of a statute, a court should ask two questions: (i)
Has Congress spoken directly to the precise question at issue? And, if
not, (2) Is the agency's answer based on a reasonable construction of the
statute? 66 If the statute is ambiguous and the agency's interpretation is
reasonable, then the court should grant the agency "Chevron deference,"
which means that the court will defer to the agency's interpretation and
not engage in its own analysis of the statute. 67 When faced with interpret-
ing the FMLA, courts have granted the Department of Labor's regula-
tions Chevron deference.6
Consistent with statutory language, the definition of "serious health
condition" focuses on the effect of an illness on the employee and the ex-
tent of treatment, rather than on the particular diagnosis.69 Although this
focus allows more flexibility than a list of covered illnesses would, in
practice, courts appear to need even greater flexibility when assessing
whether or not an illness qualifies as a serious health condition.
B. UNDER-INCLUSIVENESS
Roberts v. Human Development Association provides a good exam-
ple of the under-inclusiveness of the bright-line test.70 The plaintiff was a
home health care provider employed by Human Development Associa-
tion (HDA) for approximately seven years prior to her termination.7'
While working at the home of a patient on a Thursday, the then-sixty-
four-year-old plaintiff began to experience extensive vaginal bleeding."
She called her employer and told him to send a replacement so she could
go to the emergency room.73 After she called several times, her employer
told her a replacement would be sent. The replacement had not yet ar-
65. Karen Lee, Concerns Grow Over FMLA Administration, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT NEWS, Aug. I,
2001, available at 2000 WL 10182726.
66. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
67. Id.
68. Rhoads v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 257 F.3 d 373, 382 n.7 (4 th Cir. 2001) (citing Miller, 250
F.3d 820, 833 (4th Cir. 200r)); Thorson v. Gemini, Inc., 205 F.3d 370, 376 (8th Cir. 2000).
69. Miller, 250 F.3d at 835.
70. 4 F. Supp. 2d 154 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
71. Id. at 155.
72. Id. at 155-56.
73. Id. at 156.
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rived when the plaintiff left.74 However, the plaintiff's daughter was there
and said she would stay with her mother until the replacement arrived.75
The plaintiff went directly to the hospital and eventually underwent a di-
lation and curettage., 6 A dilation and curettage requires a general anes-
thetic and involves opening the cervix and emptying the uterus by
suction.77 The following day, the plaintiff called her employer to tell him
that she would not be at work but instead received word that she had
been terminated for leaving her job the previous day before a replace-
ment had arrived.78
The court granted summary judgment for the defendant because it
concluded that plaintiff's condition did not constitute a serious health
condition under the FMLA, which is a prerequisite for a FMLA wrongful
termination claim.79 The court stated that since the plaintiff's time at the
emergency room did not constitute "inpatient care" because she had not
stayed overnight, the plaintiff therefore had to meet one of the defini-
tions of "continuous treatment" to be covered by the Act.8°
The court applied the Department of Labor's test, which the court
interpreted as requiring the plaintiff to show that she (i) was incapaci-
tated, (2) had been seen once by a doctor, and (3) received a prescription
for a course of medication such as antibiotics. ' The court held that the
plaintiff failed to meet the threshold requirement of incapacity because
she failed to show that she was incapacitated for more than three days.
8
Although her doctor did not explicitly tell her to stay home on Friday,
the court assumed that a patient would take a reasonable period of time
to recuperate after undergoing a surgical procedure, which involved gen-
eral anesthesia. 8' The court stated that, even assuming that the plaintiff
was incapacitated on Friday, she failed to show that she was incapaci-
tated over the weekend.8 The plaintiff tried to argue that she had prop-
erly responded to an emergency situation by notifying her employer and
that the ultimate duration of her condition should not preclude the Act's
coverage.8' The court recognized the plaintiff's argument but stated that
74- Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 163.
8o. Id. at I58.
81. Id. at 158 (citing Brannon v. OshKosh B'Gosh, Inc., 897 F. Supp. IO28, 1036 (M.D. Tenn.
1995).
82. Id. at 158.
83. Id. at i6o.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 162.
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this "subjective approach to [determine] whether plaintiff had a serious
health condition has no support in either the Act or its implementing
regulations." 86
C. OVER-INCLUSVENESS
The Department of Labor's regulations are rigid, and, therefore,
many conditions fall outside FMLA protection. At the same time, the
bright-line test also serves to grant protection to some illnesses that Con-
gress did not intend the FMLA to cover. In Thorson v. Gemini, Inc., the
Eighth Circuit held that a stress-related ulcer and stomach ache was a se-
rious health condition because the plaintiff was able to meet each of the
elements of the bright-line test.87 The court held that the plaintiff,
Thorson, met the continuing treatment test because she saw her doctor
three times, satisfying the regulation requirement that an employee be
treated two or more times by a health care provider.m Thorson was ab-
sent from work for more than three days with a note from her doctor, in-
dicating that she should not work. Thorson, therefore, was
"incapacitated" as defined by the regulations. 8' The court stated that,
"[s]ubjectively, it may be that Thorson's condition was not 'serious' in
the usual sense of the word"; however, her condition met the bright-line
test so she qualified for leave under the FMLA.9'
D. THE DURATIONAL ELEMENT OF INCAPACITY
These two results exemplify how the Department of Labor's test is
both over- and under-inclusive and not in keeping with Congressional in-
tent. In both instances, the courts relied on the Department of Labor's
rigid requirement of "incapacity" that Congress did not explicitly re-
quire. Congress gave examples of illness that are covered by the FMLA
and then stated:
All of these conditions meet the general test that either the underlying
health condition or the treatment for it requires that the employee be
absent from work on a recurring basis or for more than a few days for
treatment or recovery. They also involve either inpatient care or con-
tinuing treatment or supervision by a health care provider, and fre-
quently involve both.9'
The legislative history does not suggest that a serious health condi-
tion requires incapacity for a certain duration. It does suggest, however,
86. Id.
87. 205 F.3d 370, 382 (8th Cir. 2000).
88. Id. at 377.
89. Id. at 381.
90. Id. at 379.
9 i . S. REP. No. 103-3, at 29 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 31.
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that absence from work is a factor in determining whether an illness rises
to the level of seriousness to warrant leave.92
The Department of Labor's bright-line test does not allow enough
flexibility and is inadequate for determining whether a condition rises to
the necessary level of seriousness to warrant leave. The regulations de-
fine inpatient care as well as continuous care as involving some period of
incapacity.' In order for a condition to qualify as an illness involving con-
tinuous treatment, the period of incapacity must be more than three con-
secutive days.94 During the notice and comment period, some contended
that "seriousness and duration do not necessarily correlate."'95 They ar-
gued that "a fixed time limit fails to recognize that some illnesses and
conditions are episodic or acute emergencies which may require only
brief but essential health care to prevent aggravation into a longer term
illness or injury, and thus do not easily fit into a specified linear time re-
quirement." The Women's Legal Defense Fund argued that Congress
intended the severity and normal length of disabling conditions to be
used as a general test and not a bright-line rule and suggested that if a
condition is sufficiently severe or threatening, duration is irrelevant.97
The requirement of incapacity creates rigidity and precludes cover-
age of serious conditions because courts use it as a threshold inquiry. The
regulations define incapacity as "inability to work, attend school or per-
form other regular daily activities due to the serious health condition,
treatment therefor, or recovery therefrom."" In Brannon v. Oshkosh
B'Gosh, Inc., the court held that although the plaintiff saw a doctor and
was given prescriptive drugs in addition to being absent from work for
more than three days, she did not meet the definition of serious health
condition because she could not show that she was "unable to work" or
that her absence was "due to" her illness.' Plaintiff's doctor testified that
it was reasonable for a person to miss three or four days for plaintiff's
type of illness, but the court found his testimony insufficient to prove
that her absence was "necessary."'" Other courts have strictly read the
regulations and have required that the plaintiff provide evidence not only
92. Id.
93. FMLA, 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(i)-(2) (2003).
94. Id. § 825.1I4(a)(2)(i).
95. FMLA, 6o Fed. Reg. 218o, 2192 (Jan. 6, 1995) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.114).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2)(i).
99. 897 F. Supp. 1028, 1037 (M.D. Tenn. 1995).
IOO. Id.
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that the alleged condition caused the absence, but also that the plaintiff
was not able to work during that absence. "'
The Sixth Circuit held that a plaintiff who suffered from rectal
bleeding did not have a serious health condition under the FMLA be-
cause he was only absent from work for one and a half days for his ill-
nesses and therefore did not meet the duration requirement found in the
Department of Labor's regulations.' 2 Other courts across the circuits
have followed the Sixth Circuit's approach and have held that an illness
did not qualify as a serious health condition when the period of incapac-
ity was shorter than three days."3
This strict reading of the regulatory language is insufficient when
understood in the context of legislative intent. Consequently, some
courts look to the legislative history to find more flexibility in the regula-
tions. The First Circuit held that the FMLA covers intermittent absences
as long as the plaintiff satisfied the more-than-three-consecutive-day re-
quirement at some point."'4 The court concluded that intermittent leave
was covered by the FMLA because Congress intended to include visits to
ioI. See Dey v. L. Marshall Roofing and Sheet Metal, Inc., No. oi-C-98io, 2002 WL 773989, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 2002) (dismissing plaintiff's claim on another basis but instructing plaintiff if she
replead to describe her serious health condition and its effect on her job directly); Murray v. Red Kap
Indus., Inc., 124 F.3d 695, 698 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Brannon to support holding that plaintiff's testi-
mony failed to show that her absence from work was necessary). See also Barnhill v. Farmland Foods,
Inc., No. Civ. A. 98-4152-CM, 2001 WL 487939, at *6 (D. Kan. Apr. 19, 2001) (holding that to survive
summary judgment, "plaintiff must set forth evidence to establish that she was 'unable to work at all'
or was 'unable to perform any of the essential functions' of her position within the meaning of the
ADA"); Frazier v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 2oo F.3d 1190, 1195 (8th Cir. 2000) (stating that inability
to perform one's job is a requisite element of an FMLA claim); Burnette v. Vanguard Plastics, Inc.,
No. 95-I489-JTR, 1996 WL 740548, at *2 (D. Kan. Nov. 13, 1996) (holding plaintiff's opinion testi-
mony was insufficient to base a finding that her pregnancy and related conditions kept her from per-
forming the functions of her job).
102. Bauer v. Varity Dayton-Walther Corp., 118 F.3 d 1io9, 1112 (6th Cir. 1997).
103. See Peterson v. Exide Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1270 (D. Kan. 2000); Levine v. The Chil-
dren's Museum of Indianapolis, Inc., No. IPoo-o715-C-H/G, 2002 WL 1800254, at *7 (S.D. Ind. July i,
2002); Ahern v. Dept. of Treasury, No. 99-3362, 1999 WL 121 1868, at *i (Fed. Cir. Dec. 13, 1999); see
also Barnhill, 2001 WL 487939, at *6 (holding plaintiffs absence for two and a half days was insuffi-
cient to meet the regulatory definition of serious health condition); Roberts v. Human Dev. Ass'n, 4 F.
Supp. 2d 154, 16o-6i (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that plaintiffs failure to show she was incapacitated
over the weekend, even though recovering from a dilation and curettage operation, is not a serious
health condition under the FMLA); Price v. Marathon Cheese Corp., i 19 F.3d 330,334 (5th Cir. 1997)
(holding that because plaintiff left work early on Friday due to her condition and returned to work the
following Monday, she did not satisfy the required period of incapacity); Cole v. Sisters of Charity of
the Incarnate Word, 79 F. Supp. 2d 668, 672 (E.D. Tex. 1999) (holding plaintiff failed to prove she suf-
fered from a serious health condition because there was no evidence that she was unable to perform
functions of her job); Joslin v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 8 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 116o (N.D. Iowa 1998) (hold-
ing plaintiff failed to demonstrate that her allergic reaction to an allergy shot resulted in incapacity,
and therefore her condition was not a serious health condition).
104. Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., x44 F.3d 155, 163 (Ist Cir. 1998).
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a doctor when the employee had symptoms that were eventually diag-
nosed as constituting a serious health condition, even if at the time of the
initial medical appointments, the degree of seriousness was not yet de-
termined. 5 The court concluded that the regulations supported this in-
terpretation of the statute because the definition of treatment included
"examinations to determine if a serious health condition exists and
evaluations of the condition." '06 The First Circuit looked to legislative in-
tent, noting that the regulations were broad agency interpretations of re-
strictive statutory language."
Congress stated that "[t]he term 'serious health condition' is not in-
tended to cover short-term conditions for which treatment and recovery
are very brief," because Congress expected that such illnesses would fall
under company sick leave polices.'O The Department of Labor's regula-
tions do not explicitly exclude coverage of minor illnesses." 9 A Depart-
ment opinion letter stated: "The regulations reflect the view that,
ordinarily, conditions like the common cold and flu... would not [rou-
tinely] be expected to meet the regulatory tests, [but] not that such condi-
tions could not routinely qualify under FMLA where the tests are, in
fact, met in particular cases ....
Many courts have struggled to apply the regulations to minor ill-
nesses because the text of the Department of Labor's regulations allows
any illness, regardless of severity, to warrant protection if the employee
is absent from work for the requisite amount of time and receives some
medical treatment. In assessing whether a stress-related ulcer constituted
a serious health condition, the Eighth Circuit stated that "[slubjectively,
it may be that the plaintiff's condition was not 'serious' in the usual sense
of the word," but that her illness was a serious health condition because
she was incapacitated for more than three days during which time she
saw a physician two times, which constituted "continuing treatment" un-
der the regulations."' The court justified its decision by stating that the
regulations were entitled to Chevron deference because the Department
of Labor "reasonably decided" that allowing some minor illnesses to
qualify for FMLA protection was "a 'legitimate trade-off' for having an
objective test that all employers can apply uniformly .... Unfortunately,
the case law shows that neither employers nor courts are applying this
105. Id.
1o6. Id. (emphasis omitted).
io7. Id. at 164-65.
io8. S. REP. No. 103-3, at 28 (993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 30.
io9. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
iso. Dept. of Labor Op. Letter 86, 1996 WL 1044783 (Dec. 12, 1986).
i i i. Thorson v. Gemini, Inc., 205 F.3d 370,379 (8th Cir. 2000).
112. Id. at 380.
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objective test uniformly."3 In addition, Congress did not intend for the
Department to create the rigid requirement of incapacity or the continu-
ous treatment categories that allow minor illnesses to warrant FMLA
leave."
4
E. PREGNANCY
Case law indicates that the regulations do not actually pose such a
bright-line test when it comes to conditions relating to pregnancy."' Con-
gress included "ongoing pregnancy" in its list of examples of serious
health conditions." In addition, Congress included "miscarriages, com-
plications or illnesses related to pregnancy, such as severe morning sick-
ness, [and] the need for prenatal care" in the list of examples of serious
health conditions."7 The regulations state: "[A]n expectant mother may
take FMLA leave... before the birth of the child for prenatal care or if
her condition makes her unable to work."",,8 Courts have held that preg-
nancy per se does not constitute a serious health condition and therefore
an expectant mother must show that she meets the test for continuous
treatment or has, at a minimum, suffered a period of incapacity due to
her pregnancy."9 Sections 825.II2(c) and 825.114 of the Department of
Labor Regulations seem to be inconsistent because section 825.112(c)
113. See Rankin v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 246 F.3d 1145, 1148-49 (8th Cir. 2001) (relying on Thorson,
holding genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether flu meets the Department of Labor regula-
tions which precluded summary judgment); Price v. City of Fort Wayne, 117 F.3d 1022, 1024-25 (7th
Cir. 1997) (holding several diagnoses, no one of which rises alone to level of serious health condition,
if taken together and temporally linked, can constitute serious health condition); Victorelli v. Shady-
side Hosp., 128 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 1997) (correcting the district court for relying on legislative his-
tory for the proposition that a minor ulcer did not constitute a serious health condition and remanding
the case to allow a jury to find whether the plaintiff has met the "regulatory standard"); Miller v.
AT&T, 250 F.3d 820, 835 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating definition adopted by the Department of Labor
whereby FMLA coverage may include illnesses that Congress never envisioned would be protected;
however, the regulations are not "so manifestly contrary to congressional intent as to be considered
arbitrary"); Stubl v. T.A. Sys., Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1o75, io88-89 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (holding two doctors'
visits after plaintiff's son's death constituted continuous treatment, therefore plaintiffs leave falls un-
der the FMLA).
1i4. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
115. See infra note 119.
116. S. REP. No. 103-3, at 29 (1993), reprinted in 19 9 3 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,31.
117. Id.
118. 29 C.F.R. § 825.112(C) (2003).
I I9. See Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 465, 476 (D. Kan. 1996) (hold-
ing plaintiff failed to show that her pregnancy and related conditions kept her from performing the
function of her job for more than three days); Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank, No. 96-C-4805, 1997 WL
403697, at *2 (N.D. I11. July I1, 1997) (holding that pregnancy per se is not a serious health condition
and plaintiff must show she was incapacitated and therefore unable to work in order to qualify for
FMLA leave); Whitaker v. Bosch Braking Sys. Div. of Robert Bosch Corp., 18o F. Supp. 2d 922, 929
(W.D. Mich. 2001) ("Plaintiff can succeed in establishing her claim only if she can establish a period of
incapacity due to her pregnancy[.)").
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appears to set out a separate requirement for pregnancy but does not ex-
plain how long a pregnant women needs to be unable to work to qualify
for FMLA leave.2 Courts have made sense of this discrepancy by creat-
ing a slightly less stringent incapacity requirement for pregnancy.' How-
ever, it is not clear that this is what Congress or even the Department of
Labor intended.
F. CARE FOR A FAMILY MEMBER WITH A "SERIOUS HEALTH CONDITION"
The case law regarding leave to care for a family member with a "se-
rious health condition" does not clarify the general definition of "serious
health condition" under the Act. The FMLA allows an employee to take
leave "to care for" his or her spouse, son, daughter, or parent with a seri-
ous health condition.2 ' The Department of Labor regulations state that
"needed to care for" encompasses both physical and psychological
care. 23 This type of care includes "situations where, for example, because
of a serious health condition, the family member is unable to care for his
or her own basic medical, hygienic, or nutritional needs or safety, or is
unable to transport himself or herself to the doctor."'2 4 The term also al-
lows for "providing psychological comfort and reassurance which would
be beneficial to a child, spouse, or parent with a serious health condition
who is receiving inpatient or home care.''..
Despite the broad regulatory language, courts have taken a very
strict textual approach to interpreting the language of the statute. A dis-
trict court in Illinois held that the leave provision envisioned by Congress
was leave that was necessary to provide care to a family member who
could not care for him or herself. ' Although the right to visit one's aging
parent may be within the FMLA's overall statutory objective, the court
held that it does not appear within the literal coverage allowed by the
language of the statute because the plaintiff did not establish that her
mother required her care.2 7 The court did not consider the Department
of Labor's regulations in its decision.2 A district court in Louisiana took
a similar approach when it stated that "[tlhe plain language of the FMLA
requires that [plaintiff's] leave request be for the purpose of caring for an
120. 29 C.F.R. § 825.I12(c).
121. See, e.g., Whitaker, i8o F. Supp. 2d at 928-29.
122. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(i)(C) (2oo0).
123. 29 C.F.R. § 825.116.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Cianci v. Pettibone Corp., No. 95 C 49o6, 1997 WL 182279, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 8, 1997).
127. Id.
128. Id.
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ill parent, nothing more.' ' .9 The court did not look to the Department of
Labor's regulations in determining what care entailed, but did find that
the plaintiff provided ample evidence of the "need to care" to survive
summary judgment.'30
Many courts have followed the bright-line test for serious health
conditions in determining whether a family member's condition consti-
tutes a serious health condition.'3' In a parental leave case, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that neither the physical injuries nor the emotional trauma
associated with a beating constituted a serious health condition under the
FMLA.'32 The physical injuries did not rise to the level of a serious health
condition because the plaintiff's son did not receive treatment two or
more times.'33 The psychological trauma did not constitute a serious
health condition because the plaintiff's son's drug counselor did not
evaluate or examine the son specifically for the emotional trauma caused
by this beating.'34 In addition, neither injury resulted in an incapacitation
for the requisite amount of time.'3 The Ninth Circuit did refer to the
regulatory definition of "to care for" but concluded that the plaintiff
failed to show that moving her son to the Philippines to keep him safe
constituted caring for her son.', 6 The Eighth Circuit held that the emo-
tional trauma of sexual abuse of an employee's son did not constitute a
serious health condition because there was no evidence that the condi-
tion incapacitated the son for the requisite amount of time.'37 These cases
further demonstrate the Department of Labor's test, as implemented by
129. Barrilleaux v. Thayer Lodging Group, Inc., No. 97-3252, 1999 WL 155939, at *2 n.6 (E.D. La.
Mar. 19, 1999).
i3o. Id. at *2.
131. See Seidle v. Provident Mutual Life Ins. Co., 871 F. Supp. 238, 245-46 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (hold-
ing plaintiff's son's ear infection did not constitute a serious health condition because he did not re-
ceive continuous treatment); Johnson v. Primerica, No. 94 Civ. 4869 (MBM) (RLE), 1996 WL 34148,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 1996) (holding plaintiff failed to show that son's asthma rose to the level of
serious health condition because he was not incapacitated for three days); Latella v. Nat'l. Passenger
R.R. Corp., 94 F. Supp. 2d i86, 188 (D. Conn. 1999) (holding plaintiffs testimony that son was inca-
pacitated not enough and plaintiff must submit confirmation from a health care provider).
132. Marchisheck v. San Mateo County, 199 F.3d lo68, 1o75 (9th Cir. 1999).
133. Id. at 1074.
134- Id. at 1075.
135. Id. at io76.
136. Id. In a more recent case, the Ninth Circuit reversed a summary judgment motion, however
the court held that the plaintiff must show that his father's depression resulted in an incapacity in addi-
tion to the fact that he received continuous treatment pursuant to the Department of Labor regula-
tions. Scamihorn v. Gen. Truck Drivers, 282 F.3d 1O78, io86-87 (9th Cir. 2002).
137. Martyszenko v. Safeway, Inc., 12o F.3 d 120, 123 (8th Cir. 1997). In a more recent case, the
Eight Circuit used the same bright-line regulatory test for serious health condition, but reversed a
summary judgment order and held that a three year old's ear infection might be a serious health condi-
tion if the plaintiff could show that the child was incapacitated and received the requisite treatment
from a health care provider. Caldwell v. Holland of Tex. Inc., 208 F.3d 671, 676-77 (8th Cir. 2000).
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the courts, does not take into account the effect of the illness on the indi-
vidual, but merely focuses on whether the individual is incapacitated and
made the requisite number of visits to the doctor."
3
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
The case law indicates that the Department of Labor's bright-line
test for determining whether an employee has a serious health condition
produces results that are both under-inclusive and over-inclusive and in-
consistent depending on the type of condition the court is considering.'39
In the FMLA, Congress charged the Commission on Leave to study the
existing and proposed mandatory and voluntary family and medical leave
polices of both covered and non-covered employees, as well as their
costs, benefits, and impact on productivity.'40 The Commission failed to
study the judiciary's enforcement of the Act.'4 ' The Commission on
Leave Report and several proposed bills have addressed the shortcom-
ings of the Act. However, none of these efforts have resulted in a better
test. The proposed bills would simply serve to make the current test
more rigid.'42 The Department of Labor should replace its bright-line test
with a balancing approach: one that would allow courts to consider all of
the factors found in the regulations equally in addition to other factors in
line with congressional intent.
138. When an employee wants to take leave to care for an adult family member, the condition of
that family member must rise to an even higher level than that of a child. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(t2)
(20oo). The FMLA defines the term "son or daughter" as: "[a] biological, adopted, or foster child, a
stepchild, a legal ward, or a child of a person standing in loco parentis, who is: (A) under 18 years of
age; or (B) 18 years of age or older and incapable of self-care because of a mental or physical disabil-
ity." Id. The Department of Labor's regulations state that "incapable of self-care" means the individ-
ual "requires active assistance or supervision to provide daily self-care in three or more of the
activities of daily living (ADLs) or instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs)." 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.I13(c)(I) (2003). In defining physical or mental disability, the regulations reference the defini-
tion found in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's regulations under the ADA. Id.
§ 825.t13(c)(2). The Navarro court held that 29 U.S.C. § 261I(i2)(B) may be satisfied by various com-
binations of factors which were used for ADA purposes to determine whether an individual was sub-
stantially limited in a major life activity. Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 97 (rst Cir. 2001). Other
circuits have not yet commented on what the test should be. This case indicates that the regulations
are far from clear.
139. See supra Part IV.
140. DEP'T OF LABOR & COMM'N ON LEAVE, A WORKABLE BALANCE: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FAMILY
AND MEDICAL LEAVE POLICIES XiV-Xv (1996).
141. Id.
142. See infra notes 162-73.
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A. THE COMMISSION ON LEAVE'S REPORT
The Commission on Leave began its research in November 1993.'3
The Commission was composed of congressional leaders, representatives
of women and families, labor and business communities, and ex-officio
cabinet members from federal agencies with direct interest in family and
medical leave issues.'" The Commission coordinated a variety of re-
search and information gathering efforts.'45 The data was collected in
1995 after an eighteen-month period beginning in January of 199146
The Commission's report was very favorable and indicated that
there were very few problems with administering the FMLA. 147 Accord-
ing to the report, two-thirds of the U.S. labor force, including private and
public sector employees, work for employers covered by the FMLA. 48
Two-thirds of covered worksites have changed some aspect of their poli-
cies to comply with the Act. 49 The most common change has been to ex-
pand the range of reasons for which employees can take leave. 5 ° For
example, 69.3% of covered worksites have changed their policies to pro-
vide leave for fathers to care for seriously ill or newborn children.'' The
report stated that very few employers have found that compliance entails
additional costs.'52 It also stated that most employers have found it "rela-
tively easy to administer the FMLA."'53 Between 86.4% and 95.8% of
employers report that FMLA has had no noticeable effect on business
performance. 54 The employee survey results show that 16.8% of employ-
ees have taken leave for a reason covered by the FMLA and 3.4% of
employees have needed to but did not take leave.'55 The reason most fre-
quently cited for future leave was care for a seriously ill parent., 6 About
a quarter of leave was taken by relatively young parents to care for their
children at birth, adoption or during a serious illness.'57 Ten percent of
143. DEP'T OF LABOR & COMM'N ON LEAVE, A WORKABLE BALANCE: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FAMILY
AND MEDICAL LEAVE POLICIES XiV (1996).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See id. at xv.
147. Id.
148. Id. at xvi.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at xvii.
153. Id.
154- Id. at xviii.
155. Id. at xix.
156. Id.
157. Id. at xx.
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leave was taken by older employees to care for ill parents or spouses.':
About 59% of employees of all ages took leave because of their own se-
rious health problems.'59 In general, men took more leave for their own
serious health conditions than women.'6o
While the Commission's report focused on a cost-benefit analysis of
the FMLA, it did not look at judicial enforcement of the Act, nor did it
assess whether the bright-line test resulted in consistency and predictabil-
ity as the Department of Labor intended. 6' Consequently, several Con-
gressional representatives have addressed the lack of judicial uniformity
and predictability.
B. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FMLA
In response to the difficulty in judicial application of the regulations,
several senators introduced legislation to clarify the FMLA. On August
5, 1999, Senator Gregg of New Hampshire introduced Senate Bill 1530 to
the Senate, which proposed to clarify the FMLA.' 6' The bill stated that
the FMLA "is not working as Congress intended when Congress passed
the Act in 1993 . ''I63 It went on to state that the Department of Labor
regulations are overbroad and have caused many problems by expanding
the Act's coverage to apply to many non-serious health conditions. 64 The
bill also stated that the Commission on Leave failed to identify many
problems with compliance because the studies were done too soon after
the enactment of the FMLA, and that this problem arose only when em-
ployers tried to comply with the Department of Labor's final regulations.
i65 The bill proposed two changes to the definition of "serious health con-
dition." First, the bill provided an exclusion clause which stated that, "the
term ['serious health condition'] does not include a short-term illness, in-
jury, impairment, or condition for which treatment and recovery are very
brief."' Second, the bill provided a list of examples of what the term
"serious health condition" includes, which mirrored the list found in the
Senate and House Reports that accompanied the FMLA.' 6' On May i9,
2000, Congressman Goodling of Pennsylvania introduced House Bill
158. Id.
159. Id.
16o. Id.
i6I. Id.
162. S. 1530, io6th Cong. §§ 2-3 (1999).
163. Id. § 2(I).
164. Id. § 2(2).
i65. Id. § 2(5).
i66. Id. § 3(4)(B).
167. Id. § 3(4)(C).
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4499 to amend the Family Medical Leave Act.' 6' This bill was similar to
S. 1530, but provided a slightly different proposed amendment. The bill
began with the same findings stated in S. I530.'69 The bill specifically ex-
cluded short-term conditions for which treatment and recovery were very
brief, and provided a list of conditions included in the term "serious
health condition."'"0 This list was the same list found in the Senate and
House Reports that accompanied the FMLA.'7'
Although these bills would enact Congressional intent, the problem
with both of these proposals is that they would have served only to fur-
ther restrict the application of the regulations by moving the focus away
from the effects of the condition on the employee to the actual diagnosis
of the condition. The Department of Labor rejected suggestions similar
to those found in these bills during the notice and comment period.'72
The Department explained that it did not consider it appropriate to in-
clude in the regulation a "laundry list of serious health conditions listed
in the legislative history because their inclusion may lead employers to
recognize only conditions on the list or to second-guess whether a condi-
tion is equally serious, rather than apply the regulatory standard."'73
C. A PROPOSED BALANCING TEST
The Department of Labor should abandon the current test and re-
place it with a balancing test, which would include all of the factors found
in the so-called "objective test." Courts should consider the following
factors as they assess whether or not an employee is entitled to FMLA
leave: (i) whether the employee received inpatient care; (2) whether the
employee was incapacitated by the alleged condition; (3) the extent, na-
ture and duration of incapacity; (4) whether the employee received
treatment for the alleged condition; (5) the frequency, extent, and nature
of the treatment; (6) evidence of prior unexplained absences; and (7)
whether the employer received notice as required by the statute.'74
This balancing test would allow the courts to determine in a more
realistic manner whether a condition rises to the level of seriousness that
warrants leave. For example, in Roberts v. Human Development Associa-
tion, the court would have had more flexibility in determining whether or
i68. H.R. 4499, io6th Cong. §§ 2-3 (2ooo).
69. Id. § 2(I).
170. Id. § 3(a).
171. Id.
172. FMLA, 6o Fed. Reg. 2180, 2195 (Jan. 6, 1995) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825.114).
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., Bailey v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1041, 1045-46 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that
plaintiff failed to give his employer adequate notice under the FMLA and that his seventy-two unex-
cused absences justified his termination).
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not plaintiff's severe vaginal bleeding was a serious health condition. Ac-
cording to the first factor, the employee did not receive inpatient care as
defined by the regulations because she did not spend the night in the
hospital.'75 The facts indicated, though, that the plaintiff was incapaci-
tated by the condition for at least one and a half days. 76 Unlike the
bright-line test found in the regulations, the balancing test would have
allowed the court to consider the nature and extent of an employee's in-
capacity in addition to its duration. In this case, during the plaintiff's in-
capacity, she went directly to the emergency room and underwent
outpatient surgery.' The plaintiff was sixty-four years old, and as the
court recognized, it was conceivable that an older woman's healing proc-
ess may be a slower.' 8 The following day, which was a Friday, she in-
tended to recuperate at home, and she presumably intended to
recuperate over the weekend as well.'79 The plaintiff did receive treat-
ment for her condition in the form of outpatient surgery.' 8° Although
plaintiff's treatment did not constitute inpatient care, the fifth factor in
the balancing-test would have allowed the court to consider the fre-
quency, nature and extent of that treatment. The plaintiff's treatment
consisted of undergoing a surgical procedure performed while she was
under general anesthesia.' Under a balancing test approach, the court
would have also considered information regarding how long such a pro-
cedure takes, the pain and discomfort patients feel afterwards, and
whether the procedure required follow-up examinations with a health
care provider. There was no evidence that the plaintiff has any prior un-
explained absences. The danger that the plaintiff was trying to abuse the
FMLA was small because there was no indication that she was frequently
absent from work. Finally, the court would have considered whether the
employee gave her employer adequate notice. Although the statute re-
quires a thirty-day notice, it also recognizes that there are instances
where this is not possible and instructs employees to provide "such no-
tice as is practicable.""" The evidence indicated that the plaintiff gave her
employer notice of her condition as soon as she could.' She called her
employer and asked him to send a replacement.I' In addition, she called
175. Roberts v. Human Dev. Ass'n, 4 F. Supp. 2d i54, 158 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
176. Id. at 156.
177. Id.
178. Id. at i6o.
179. Id. at 156.
i8o. Id.
181. Id. at i6o.
182. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(2)(e)(i) (2ooo).
r83. Roberts, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 156.
r84. Id.
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her employer in the morning of the following day to tell him that she
would not be able to work that day.' 85 By considering all of the factors in
the balancing test, the court could have used a subjective approach and
found that the plaintiff's condition did constitute a serious health condi-
tion, and therefore her claim for wrongful termination could survive
summary judgment.
Not only would this balancing test address the problem of under-
inclusiveness, it would also address the problem of over-inclusiveness.
Thorson v. Gemini, Inc. provides a good example.' 6 Thorson did not re-
ceive inpatient care and the evidence was inconclusive as to whether or
not Thorson was incapacitated.'8 The evidence indicated that she was
absent from work for more than three days and had a note from her doc-
tor. ' 8 The court concluded that there was no genuine issue of fact regard-
ing her incapacity because Thorson's employer failed to require her to
provide medical certification.' 89 Therefore, there was no evidence regard-
ing the third factor, the extent or nature of Thorson's alleged incapacity.
Thorson received treatment on two different occasions in a period of a
few days.'" Thorson's treatment consisted of two doctor's visits regarding
her diarrhea and stomach cramps.'9 ' The first doctor did some tests for a
peptic ulcer or gallbladder disease, but the test results were normal.'92
Three weeks after the first doctor's visit, Thorson saw another doctor
who determined that she had stress-related hiatal hernia, mild antral gas-
tritis, which could be treated with antacid, and duodenitis.'93 Thorson's
condition did not require surgery or any hospitalization.' In addition,
there was no indication that Thorson needed to recuperate from either of
these doctor's visits or that her subsequent treatment would be debilitat-
ing in any way.'95
The court noted that Thorson was fired because she exceeded the
five percent acceptable absenteeism policy at Gemini.' 6 This limit cov-
ered all absences regardless of cause, excluding holidays, scheduled vaca-
tions and approved leaves of absence.'97 The court's observation indicates
185. Id.
I86. 205 F.3d 370 (8th Cir. 2000).
187. Id. at 381.
i88. Id.
189. Id. at 382.
19o. Id. at 374.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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that there was evidence of prior unexplained absences, which suggests
that Thorson may have tried to abuse the FMLA leave provisions by
claiming that her condition constituted a serious health condition. Fi-
nally, it was clear that Thorson gave her employer a doctor's note stating
that she could not work the days she had been absent.'o The evidence in-
dicated, however, that she left work early complaining of diarrhea and
stomach cramps and there was no indication that she went through any
formal process to notify her employer of her need for leave.' 9 The stat-
ute requires an employee to give such notice as is practicable."° It ap-
peared that Thorson gave notice only after she went to the doctor, rather
than as soon as she was aware of her condition.0' On balance, Thorson's
condition might not have constituted a serious health condition because
the nature and extent of her incapacity and treatment was minimal and
there was some indication that she may have tried to abuse the FMLA
leave provisions.
CONCLUSION
The Department of Labor's regulations interpreting the Act have
not resulted in uniformity or consistency in how employers or courts de-
termine whether an employee qualifies for leave under the Act."2 Courts
have not applied the regulations in a uniform and consistent manner. The
Department should amend the regulations to reflect a broader definition
of "serious health condition." Defining a "serious health condition" is
inherently difficult because illnesses affect individuals in different ways.
Duration is not the most important criterion. A balancing test allows
courts to consider how an illness affects an individual and his ability to
work. Although courts will come to different conclusions under a balanc-
ing test, the results are likely to be more accurate and equitable because
the court will be able to look at the context of the illness and the em-
ployee's need for leave. The Department of Labor should amend its
regulations to give the courts more flexibility in determining whether an
illness is serious enough to warrant FMLA leave.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(2)(e)(I)(2ooo).
2oi. See Thorson, 2o5 F.3d at 374.
202. See supra Part VI.
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